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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT FOLLOWS 
HALL STREET PRECEDENCE, VOIDS ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN GAMBLING 
COMPACT: A COMMENT ON CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION V. OKLAHOMA 
By 
Mary Bonacchi* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. has had 
a wide-ranging impact upon the types of review permitted under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) in the United States. The court in Hall Street held that the only permissible 
forms of review in arbitration are listed in 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-11 of the FAA.1 Those remedies 
are exclusive, and parties subject to the FAA may not contract for a different method of 
review by the courts.2 This principle was recently examined in Citizen Potawatomi Nation 
v. Oklahoma.3 In this case, an arbitration clause within a gambling compact was deemed 
void when the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that an 
impermissible de novo review provision violated the FAA.4 This case allowed the Tenth 
Circuit to re-examine the principles of the Hall Street case and re-assert the reasoning for 
rejecting de novo review of an arbitration proceeding by the federal courts.5 This case 
demonstrates that the principles first expressed in Hall Street are still the preference of the 
Tenth Circuit. Citizen Potawatomi Nation also establishes that while contract freedom is a 
cornerstone of American arbitration, parties to an arbitration agreement will not be 
permitted to exceed the limited review areas permitted by the FAA in sections 9,10, and 
11.6 Finally, this case illustrates the uneven bargaining power that may exist in the 
arbitration process when one party, even another sovereign party, agrees to sign an 
arbitration agreement with a much savvier and powerful legal opponent. 
 
II. CASE BACKGROUND 
 
On November 30, 2004, the Chairman of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“the Nation”) 
signed a Tribal-state gambling compact (“the Compact”) with the state of Oklahoma.7 The 
 
* The author is the Articles Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2020 Juris Doctor Candidate at The 
Pennsylvania State University Law School. 
 
1 See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008). 
 
2 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S at 586-87. 
 
3 Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma, 881 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 
4 Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma, 881 F.3d at 1228.  
  
5 Id. at 1236-37. 
 
6 Id. 
 
7 Id. at 1228. 
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Compact, which became effective on February 9, 2005, allowed Class III gaming to take 
place on tribal lands.8 The Compact stated the sovereignty of both parties, and the historic 
right of the Nation to self-determination and self-governance.9 The Compact focused on 
the gambling rights that the Nation would enjoy at their two facilities, the FireLake Grand 
Casino and the FireLake Entertainment Center, and the responsibilities of the parties 
towards each other.10 Part 5(I) of the Compact stated that the tribal facilities had to be in 
compliance with Oklahoma and tribal alcohol laws.11 The Compact’s arbitration clause 
provided for the parties to submit any disputes arising under the Compact to arbitration 
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). In addition, the 
Compact stated that “either party to the Compact may bring an action against the other in 
a federal district court for the de novo review of any arbitration award under paragraph 2 
[the arbitration clause] of this Part. The decision of the court shall be subject to appeal.”12  
Issues between the parties began when Oklahoma’s Alcohol Beverage Laws 
Enforcement Commission (“ABLE”) alleged that the Nation was selling alcohol on 
Sundays in violation of Oklahoma law.13 As ABLE began proceedings against the Nation, 
the Oklahoma Tax Commission (“the OTC”) also sent a request to obtain the sales tax 
returns of the Nation regarding their alcohol sales.14 Oklahoma Law required the Nation to 
obtain licenses from both ABLE and the OTC.15Both ABLE and the OTC were able to 
revoke those licenses if a violation was committed.16 In response to these allegations, and 
while the ABLE and OTC proceedings were ongoing, the Nation invoked the arbitration 
clause of the Compact.17 The Nation believed that the ABLE allegations and alcohol sales 
tax issues fell under Compact Part 5(I).18 Oklahoma moved to dismiss the Nation’s 
arbitration claim, arguing that, as the substantive issues central to the dispute were 
regulatory, they should be handled through administrative proceedings as opposed to 
arbitration.19 The arbitrator ruled that the issue was arbitrable, agreeing with the Nation’s 
 
8 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1229. 
 
9 Id.   
 
10 Id.  
 
11 Id. 
 
12 Id. 
 
13 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1230.  
 
14 Id. 
 
15 Id. at 1229-1230; Okla. Stat. tit. 37, §§ 527.1, 528; Okla. Stat. tit. 37, §§ 163.7, 577; Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 
212(A)(2). 
 
16  Id. 
 
17 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1230-31. 
 
18 Id. 
 
19 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1231. 
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theory that the arbitration agreement in the Compact was the only remedy for licensing 
disputes.20  
The arbitrator then conducted a hearing, where the Nation prevailed.21 The arbitrator 
ruled that the sovereignty of the Nation prevented Oklahoma from enforcing a sales tax on 
items sold by the Nation.22 The arbitrator enjoined Oklahoma from attempting to halt the 
Nation’s ability to sell alcohol at Compact facilities or from taking further legal action 
against the Nation to force them to pay state sales taxes.23 
After the award was announced, the Nation filed an action in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to enforce the award; Oklahoma filed a motion  
for vacatur of the award.24 Along with other claims, including their insistence that the 
arbitration went beyond the bounds of the Compact, Oklahoma argued that they were 
entitled to de novo review of the “factual and legal issues” in the arbitration hearing.25 The 
district court found for the Nation, agreeing with the arbitrator’s determinations with 
regards to the Compact, and ordered that the award be enforced.26 Speaking to Oklahoma’s 
assertion that they were entitled to de novo review, the district court found that Oklahoma’s 
argument was “foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent.”27 The district court found that, in 
accordance with Supreme Court precedence in the Hall Street decision, only those grounds 
contained in §§ 10 or 11 of the FAA could modify or vacate an arbitration award; the de 
novo review contained in the Compact was impermissibly broad and not within the scope 
of §§ 10 and 11.28 While the district court noted that the de novo review was improper, they 
did not enter into a discussion as to whether the entire arbitration clause was nullified by 
the de novo review provision.29  
On appeal, Oklahoma made several arguments as to why the arbitration award should 
be vacated based on the merits of the arbitration, namely that the issues were not all 
 
 
20 Id. at 1230-31. 
 
21 Id. at 1233. 
 
22 Id. 
 
23 Id.  
 
24 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1233; 9 U.S.C. § 9; 9 U.S.C § 10(a)(4). 
 
25 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1234. 
 
26 Id.  
 
27 Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-16-361-C, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80405, at *9 (W.D. 
Okla. June 21, 2016). 
 
28 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80405, at *9. 
 
29 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1234. 
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arbitrated and that the matters arbitrated exceeded the arbitrator’s power.30 Oklahoma, 
however, also advanced two theories as to the de novo review portion of the arbitration 
agreement.31 First, Oklahoma argued that the district court erred in not granting de novo 
review on the merits which the Compact provided for.32 Specifically, Oklahoma argued 
that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“the IGRA”), and its preference for federal 
litigation to resolve disputes, overruled the FAA.33 In Oklahoma’s view, as the Secretary 
of the Interior had approved the Compact, Hall Street and the FAA could not discredit it.34 
In the alternative, the state argued that if de novo review was prohibited, then the district 
court should have severed the arbitration agreement from the Compact, as the de novo 
review provision was a material aspect of the arbitration clause of the Compact.35 
The Nation argued that disallowing the de novo review clause would not make the 
arbitration agreement invalid; the de novo review clause simply could be separated from 
the rest of the Compact.36 The Nation also did not provide that any portion of the Compact 
was ambiguous.37 They instead pointed to extrinsic evidence they presented during the 
arbitration to assert that the de novo provision was not material to the Compact.38 Finally, 
the Nation suggested that if the arbitration clause was invalidated, the ability to resolve 
future disputes between the Nation and Oklahoma would be compromised, as would their 
sovereignty which the Nation had sought to protect.39  
 
III.       APPELLATE COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 
To begin their analysis, the Tenth Circuit dismissed several of Oklahoma’s claims as 
irrelevant to the central issue of the case.40 The court determined that it would be 
unproductive to look at the merits of the arbitrator’s award or use other forms of review.41 
 
30 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1234-35. (Oklahoma attempted to argue that, instead of 
interpreting the Compact, the arbitrator instead attempted to make public policy by declaring Oklahoma’s 
sales tax laws invalid in relation to the Nation’s gaming facilities under the Compact. See footnote 11.) 
 
31 Id. at 1235. 
 
32 Id. at 1235. 
 
33 Id. at 1236-37; Oklahoma's Opening Br. at 42-44. 
 
34 Id. 
 
35 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1235-37. 
 
36 Id. at 1238; See The Nation's Br. at 23. 
 
37 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1240; The Nation's Br. at 24. 
 
38 Id. 
 
39 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1241. 
 
40 Id. at 1235-36. 
 
41 Id. at 1235-36. 
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If de novo review was determined to be a material aspect of the Compact, then the 
arbitration agreement would be void, making any other analysis moot.42 The court, 
therefore, mainly focused on the claims of materiality and severability of the arbitration 
clause raised by Oklahoma. 43 
The court began its analysis by examining whether the de novo review portion of the 
arbitration agreement was invalid.44 The court “quickly disposed” of the notion that the de 
novo review prescribed in the Compact was “still valid and enforceable.”45 While 
Oklahoma argued that the principles behind the IGRA overruled the FAA, the appellate 
court disagreed.46  The appellate court found that no policies that Oklahoma cited could 
overrule the FAA and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street.47 The court reasoned 
that no portion of the IGRA affected arbitration, nor expressed supremacy over the FAA.48 
As the purpose of the FAA was to create an expedited review of judicial matters, the 
appellate court was unwilling to view the IGRA as overruling the FAA.49 The court 
finished its review of this issue by stating, “Because Hall Street Associates makes clear the 
de novo review provision set out in Compact Part 12(3) is legally invalid, this court must 
turn to the question whether that provision is a material aspect of the parties' agreement to 
engage in binding arbitration.”50 
The Tenth Circuit then moved to the issue of whether the de novo portion of the 
arbitration agreement was a material part of the parties’ agreement and, if it was, could 
therefore be severed from the Compact in part or in full.51 The court determined that the 
decision in Hall Street did not discuss whether severability of the arbitration clause was 
the correct remedy to an improper de novo review clause.52 Therefore, Hall Street did not 
 
 
42 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1236. 
 
43 Id.  
 
44 Id. 
 
45 Id. 
 
46 Id. at 1236; Oklahoma's Opening Br. at 42. 
 
47 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1236-37. 
 
48 Id. at 1237 
 
49 Id.  
 
50 Id. at 1238. 
 
51 Id. at 1238-41. 
 
52 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1238; see Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S at 587 n. 6. 
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have any bearing on whether the arbitration clause could be severable.53 The Tenth Circuit 
then engaged in its own severability analysis.54  
The court’s severability analysis began by stating precedent from previous cases.55 
The court established that not only was arbitration based in contract law, but when 
enforcing an arbitration agreement, a court might invalidate the arbitration agreement 
based on traditional contract defenses.56 A gaming compact is a contract.57 As such, the 
Compact was subject to contract law and federal common law.58 Federal common law 
principles wouldthen determine if the de novo review clause was a material part of the 
contract.59 The court noted that federal contract law states that if a contract is not 
ambiguous, the court will determine the meaning of the contract from its wording only.60 
Parol, or extrinsic, evidence, can only be considered if the terms of the contract are 
unclear.61 Using this standard, “[w]hen considered as a whole,” the court stated, “[c]ompact 
Part 12 makes clear that the parties' agreement to engage in binding arbitration was 
specifically conditioned on,  and inextricably linked to, the availability of de novo review 
in federal court.”62  
The court then examined the Compact itself.63 First, the Compact itself contained a 
severability provision, which analyzed whether the parties would have agreed to the 
arbitration clause if the de novo review section was not included.64 Second, while the 
Compact contained a waiver of sovereign immunity to allow for de novo review by a 
 
53 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1238. 
 
54 Id. at 1238-41. 
 
55 Id. at 1238-39; see Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67-68 (2010); Pueblo of Santa Ana 
v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1556 (10th Cir. 1997); Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pauma & 
Yuima Reservation v. California, 813 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2015); Anthony v. United States, 987 F.2d 
670, 673 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Arizona v. Tohono O'odham Nation, 818 F.3d 549, 560-61 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 
56 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1238; see Rent-A-Center, West, 561 U.S. at 67-68.  
 
57 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1238-39; see Pueblo of Santa Ana, 104 F.3d at 1556. 
 
58 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1239; see Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 813 F.3d at 
1163 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding compacts governed by the IGRA were under the purview of federal common 
law). 
 
59 Id. 
 
60 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1239; see Anthony, 987 F.2d at 673; see also Tohono O'odham 
Nation, 818 F.3d at 560-61. 
 
61 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1239; see Tohono O'odham Nation, 818 F.3d at 560-61. 
 
62 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1239-40. 
 
63 Id. at 1240-41. 
 
64 Id.  at 1240. 
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federal court; this waiver did not apply to other portions of the arbitration agreement and 
demonstrated to the appellate court that de novo review was a material part of the contract.65 
Finally, the court dismissed the Nation’s reliance on extrinsic evidence and their claim that 
voiding the arbitration clause would result in future Compact enforcement problems 
between the Nation and the state of Oklahoma.66 Since the Compact as it was written was 
not ambiguous, and the extrinsic evidence provided was not relevant to the materiality of 
the de novo review provision, the court declined to give these arguments weight in their 
analysis.67 As for the Nation’s fears about enforcement problems, the court was dismissive, 
stating that public policy concerns could not override a court’s determination that a material 
element of a contract was improper.68  
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit held that the de novo review portion of the Compact 
was a material part of the arbitration agreement and that the Supreme Court’s precedence 
in Hall Street barred de novo review.69 Therefore, the arbitration clause of the Compact 
was severed and invalidated.70 As a result, the court ordered that the case be remanded to 
the district court, and that the arbitration award should be vacated.71 
 
IV.        SIGNIFICANCE 
 
The federal courts’ preference for judicial deference to arbitration has allowed parties 
to contract their arbitration with little interference from federal courts.72 The Hall Street 
case represented a recent limitation that affected the contracting powers of parties creating 
an arbitration agreement.73 This limitation significantly affected the outcome in Citizen 
Potawatomi Nation, where not complying with Hall Street led to the severing of the parties’ 
arbitration clause from their gambling compact.74 This decision is significant in several 
ways, as it reaffirms: (1) that the pre- Hall Street circuit split has been resolved; (2) that 
federal arbitration policies still have preference over state concerns; and (3) that an 
 
65 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1240; see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). 
 
66 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1240-41. 
 
67 Id. 
 
68 Id. at 1241. 
 
69 Id. 
 
70 Id. 
 
71 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1241. 
 
72 See Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 508 (2001). 
 
73 See Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 576-592; see also David W. Rivkin and Eric P. Tuchmann, Hall 
Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.: Protecting Both the FAA and Party Autonomy: The Hall Street Decision, 
17 Am. Rev. Int'l. Arb. 537, 538 (2006) (discussing the impacts of Hall Street on autonomy in contracts).  
 
74 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1241. 
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incorrect review provision of an arbitration agreement in violation of the Hall Street 
precedent can sever the entire arbitration agreement. 
In the years before the Hall Street decision, the federal circuits were split as to whether 
review provisions, like the one at the center of Citizen Potawatomi Nation, could exist 
within the framework of the FAA.75 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits held in several cases that 
parties “may not contract for expanded judicial review.”76 The Eighth Circuit expressed 
agreement with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, albeit in dicta.77 However, the First, Third, 
Fifth, and Sixth Circuits allowed the expanded grounds for judicial review in their 
opinions.78 The Fourth Circuit also supported this position in an unpublished opinion.79 
The Supreme Court in Hall Street ended the circuit split over whether parties could add 
other grounds than the ones listed in Section 10 of the FAA to institute judicial review of 
an arbitration decision.80 By upholding their past precedence and the precedent in Hall 
Street, the Tenth Circuit in Citizen Potawatomi Nation re-affirmed that expanded judicial 
review is not permitted by sections 10 and 11 of the FAA. 
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit roundly rejected that federal or state law principles 
could overrule the FAA.81 Oklahoma had argued that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
and the approval of their Secretary of the Interior should take precedence before the FAA 
when deciding if the arbitration clause was valid.82 The Tenth Circuit’s dismissal of these 
arguments was significant, demonstrating that the FAA and the Hall Street decision were 
not limited by other principles of federal law. The limitation on review that would normally 
be allowed by other federal statutes shows that the arbitration policy laid out in Hall Street 
will be binding on arbitration, even if other statutes are implicated. 
Finally, this case answers a question that was left untouched by the Hall Street court, 
whether an arbitration agreement could be severed from a contract if it contained an 
impermissible review provision.83 Before the Tenth Circuit decided Citizen Potawatomi 
 
75 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583 n.5. 
 
76 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583 n.5; see also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 
341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
 
77 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583 n.5; see also UHC Management Co. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 
148 F.3d 992, 997-998 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 
78 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583 n.5; see also Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 
F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. International Marketing Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 
710 (6th Cir. 2005); Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Gateway 
Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 
79 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583 n.5; see also Syncor Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 21248 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997). 
 
80 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583 n.5.  
 
81 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1236-38. 
 
82 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1236-37; Oklahoma's Opening Br. at 42-44. 
 
83 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1238; Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S at 587 n. 6. 
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Nation, it was unclear whether an entire arbitration clause could be severed from a contract. 
The district court, in initially taking the case, only sought to invalidate the offending de 
novo portion of the agreement.84 However, the appellate court rejected this analysis.85 The 
court instead applied contract law to the agreement and determined the materiality of a 
non-approved method of review to the arbitration agreement determines whether it will 
invalidate the entire arbitration agreement or just that individual clause.86  
 
V.       CRITIQUE 
 
Citizen Potawatomi Nation highlights several issues with the arbitral process that are 
still debated throughout the United States. First, the case demonstrates that severing an 
arbitration clause can leave the parties to a contract without remedy. Second, while contract 
freedom is valued in arbitration, there is a limit as to what the courts and the FAA will 
permit. Finally, this case demonstrates that when there is a perceived unfairness in an 
arbitration, or one party to a contract is perceived to have greater bargaining power than 
the other, arbitration has the potential to be distrusted by the public. 
The central issue of Citizen Potawatomi Nation was whether the arbitration clause as a 
whole was severable, or if the de novo review portion of the Compact alone was 
severable.87 To make this determination, the court engaged in a materiality analysis.88 If 
the de novo review clause was a material part of the contract, then it would invalidate the 
entire arbitration clause; if not, then only the de novo review portion of the Compact would 
be struck.89 The Tenth Circuit’s materiality analysis was straightforward and based in well-
established contract principles, providing a clear roadmap for the district courts in their 
circuit.  
However, even if the Tenth Circuit correctly determined the materiality of the de novo 
provision, the court’s vacatur of award and their severing of the arbitration clause did away 
with the only form of relief available to both Oklahoma and the Nation under the Compact. 
The Compact was created by the Oklahoma legislature for the purpose of engaging with 
various sovereign native nations that reside within the state’s borders with regards to 
gaming issues.90 The separation of the arbitration clause in the Compact does not just affect 
 
 
84 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1234. 
 
85 Id. at 1238-41. 
 
86 Id.  
 
87 Id. at 1238. 
 
88 Id. at 1238-41. 
 
89 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1238-41. 
 
90 See CPN Public Information Office, 10th Circuit panel decision makes tribal-state gaming compact 
unenforceable, reverses arbitration decision, CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION, 
https://www.potawatomi.org/10th-circuit-panel-decision-makes-tribal-state-gaming-compact-
unenforceable-reverses-arbitration-decision/ (Feb. 8, 2018). 
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the parties in this case, but any nation that has signed a gambling compact with 
Oklahoma.91 Each of those parties now has no clear remedy to resolve disputes under the 
Compact.92 While the court’s legal conclusion may have been technically correct, the court 
inappropriately dismissed the public policy concerns inherent in declaring the Compact’s 
arbitration clause void, as doing so created far reaching enforcement issues for both native 
nations and Oklahoma. 
Furthermore, contract freedom is also curtailed in Citizen Potawatomi Nation through 
the precedent of its predecessor, Hall Street. The power of parties to contract into an 
arbitration agreement that offers review of the arbitration is limited by the decision of Hall 
Street and the remedies listed in sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.93 Oklahoma vigorously 
argued before that Tenth Circuit that the arbitration clause that the state and the Nation had 
contracted for was allowed by federal law, and therefore, should not be severed from the 
compact.94 However, in both this decision and in Hall Street, the federal courts have 
maintained that measures not in the FAA may not be contracted into an arbitration 
agreement.95 As the Hall Street court maintained, the FAA made it clear that the forms of 
review in sections 9 through 11 were exclusive.96 No contract and no federal regulations 
can circumvent the dictates of Hall Street.  
In addition, the outcome of the case could be seen to reinforce a pervasive criticism of 
arbitration: the stronger, better-equipped party in an arbitration agreement will prevail over 
the weaker party. The Compact was an Oklahoma law, and the Citizen Potawatomi Nation 
paid more than $4 million in 2017 in exclusivity fees to be a party to this Compact.97 The 
Nation received a favorable outcome from the arbitration process they were compelled to 
agree to by the terms of the Compact.98 The state of Oklahoma then argued against the very 
arbitration clause it had created, stating that the clause was invalid due to the precedent in 
Hall Street.99 The court’s decision to sever the entire arbitration agreement removes a form 
of recourse that the Citizen Potawatomi Nation saw as essential to maintaining their 
 
91  See CPN Public Information Office, 10th Circuit panel decision makes tribal-state gaming compact 
unenforceable, reverses arbitration decision, CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION, 
https://www.potawatomi.org/10th-circuit-panel-decision-makes-tribal-state-gaming-compact-
unenforceable-reverses-arbitration-decision/ (Feb. 8, 2018). 
 
92 Id. 
 
93 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S at 578. 
 
94 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1236-37; Oklahoma's Opening Br. at 42-44. 
 
95 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1238. 
 
96 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S at 578. 
 
97 See Id..  
 
98 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1233. 
 
99 Id. at 1235-37. 
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sovereignty.100 Judge Murphy, writing for the court, admitted that, in his opinion, the 
Nation would more than likely waive its sovereign immunity when taking new complaints 
before a federal court as opposed to their previous arbitration proceedings.101 To the Citizen 
Potawatomi Nation, that has been the focus of Oklahoma’s attempt to widen its taxation 
jurisdiction, as well as the wider native community that has seen five recent Indian Law 
petitions to the Supreme Court rejected (including the writ of certiorari for the present 
case), the decision in Citizen Potawatomi Nation only serves as another example of a 
disparate arbitration and court system that ignores native sovereignty.102 
 
VI.       CONCLUSION 
 
Citizen Potawatomi Nation was decided according to the precedent set by the 
Supreme Court in Hall Street.103 However, freedom of contract issues, disputes between 
federal laws, and public policy concerns raise several questions as to the viability of such 
a precedent. For the time being, however, the circuit split of the pre-Hall Street days104 
remains in the past and the federal courts seem willing to sever arbitration agreements 
that run afoul of this case. When formulating their arbitration agreements, parties must 
ensure that their contracts do not contain methods of review not explicitly mentioned in 
the FAA. While the Nation and Oklahoma must wait until the present Compact expires in 
2020 to create a new Compact, the decision of the Tenth Circuit gives the parties a clear 
guideline as to what methods of review are acceptable.105 
 
100 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1241. 
 
101 Id. at 1241 n.21. 
 
102 Citizen Potawatomi Nation hits end of the line at Supreme Court, Indianz.com, 
https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/10/15/citizen-potawatomi-nation-hits-end-of-th.asp (Oct. 15, 2018). 
 
103 Citizen Potawatomi Nation, 881 F.3d at 1236-37. 
 
104 See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 583 n.5. 
 
105 Id.  
